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1  INTRODUCTION
The  Brady  plan,  with its  emphasis  on  negotiated  debt  reduction  with
possible  support  from  official  sources,  has increased  the  importance  of  a good
understanding  of the  pricing  of external  debt  in  secondary  markets.  It is
clearly  difficult  to assess  the  feasibility  of  different  debt  restructuring
schemes  without  a  better  understanding  of the  pricing  of  existing  debt  in  the
secondary  market,  and  the  likely  effects  of different  debt  reduction
strategies  on secondary  market  prices.  After  all,  these  prices  represent  the
opportunity  cost  to  holders  of the  claims  being  restructured  and  define  the
limits  within  which  the  bargaining  process  can  produce  an outcome.  Three  major
issues  are  at stake.  First  the  impact  of debt  reduction  per  se on the
valuation  of the  claims  that  remain.  Second  the  extent  to  which  credit
enhancements,  through  collateralization  and  forms  of official  guarantees  for
newly  created  claims,  increase  the  market  value  of the  instruments  to  which
such  enh.ancements  are  attached.  Third,  the  impact  of changes  in  seniority
structure  due to  the  newly  created  claims.  These  problems  are  interrelated  in
that  debt  reduction  itself  may affect  the  valuation  of credit  enhancements  on
remaining  or newly  created  instruments.
Existing  modals  fall  short  of providing  the  necessary  consistent
approach  to  secondary  market  pricing  of existing  debt  and  newly  created,
partly  enhanced  claims.  We  will  argue  below  that  most  existing  models  are
insufficiently  equipped  to discuss  the  dynamics  of secondary  market  prices
under  alternative  debt  reduction  strategies  and  few  are  able  to  provide
insights  on the  value  of credit  enhancement.
Most models  used for  pricing  secondary  market  debt  can  be classified  in
one  of two  classes:
1) the  all-or-nothing  approach:  in  each  year,  the  debtor  pays  its  debt
service  obligation  in  full  with  a certain  probability  and  pays  nothing  with
one  minus  that  probability.  Special  cases  are  a  constant  probability  p over
time,  in  which  case  the  secondary  market  price  equals  p (for  instance,  Martin
and  van  Wijnbergen  (1989));  or a geometrically  decl:ning  probability,  which
would  warrant  use  of a constant  risk  adjusted  discount  rate  to calculate  the
present  value  of contractual  repayments  (for  instance,  Lamdany  (1988)).
2) the  certainty  approach:  here  the  secondary  market  price  is the
present  value  of future  trade  balances  (with  some  corrections),  taken  as
exogenous  and  deterministic,  and  divided  by the  face  value  of debt (for
instance,  Dooley  and  Symansky  (1989),  and  Rodriguez  (1988)).
Both  approaches  have their  weaknesses.  The  all-or-nothing  approach  does
not  allow  one to  discuss  the  effects  of a debt  reduction  on the  secondary
market  price:  this  price  remains  the  exogenous  probability  of (willingness  of)
repayment  and is  not affected  by any  amount  of debt  reduction.  Marginal  and
average  price  of debt  are  equal  by assumption  under  this  approach.  Neither
does it  allow  for  a full  discussion  of guarantees  that  are  tied  to  debt
reduction  schemes,  as the  value  of a guarantee  is  independent  of  any  debt
reduction  taking  place.
The  certainty  approach  ignores  the  impact  of debt  reduction  on the
present  value  of expected  repayments  completely  and  can  by construction  not  be
used to  evaluate  guarantees  or the  impact  of  changes  in the  seniority3
structure,  since  these  issues  are  inherently  related  to existing  uncertainty
about  likelihood  and  magnitude  of repayment.  The  approach  can  however  account
for  different  price  paths  in  response  to  debt  reduction.
The  weaknesses  of these  models  point  to the  importance  of  modelling
explicitly  the  sources  of  uncertainty  driving  secondary  market  prices.  The
improved  understanding  of secondary  market  prices  that  would  result  is,  in
turn,  important  for  an assessment  of debt  reduction  schemes;  an evaluation  of
the  market  value  of  new instruments  is  essential  for  an assessment  of the
feasibility  of any  given  proposal.  Finally,  explicit  modeling  of the  sources
of uncertainty  allows  for  an assessment  of the  impact  of  different  repayment
schedules  and  seniority  structure  on secondary  market  prices.  This  explicit
modeling  is the  more  important  as some  debt  reduction  schemes  involve
enhancements  through  guarantees  and  collaterals  whose  values  are
state-contingent  since  they  depend  on the  stochastic  pattern  of amounts
available  for  repayments.
This  paper  presents  a model  for  pricing  and  evaluating  existing  and  new
(possibly  credit  enhanced)  claims  using  option  pricing  techniques  which
explicitly  models  sources  and  natures  of risks  on sovereign  debt.  The  paper  is
structured  as follows.  Section  2 sets  out  the  basic  approach;  we present  a
pricing  model  of secondary  market  debt  using  option  pricing  tools.  In  Section
3  we apply  the  approach  to  pricing  of claims  with  fixed  and/or  rolling
interest  and  principal  guarantees.  We also  show  how to  price  recapture  clauses
that  can  be associated  with  newly  created  debt  claims. Section  4 presents  an
application  to  Mexico  and  discusses  the  valuation  and  likely  impact  on
secondary  markets  of the  recent  agreement  between  Mexico  and  its  commercial
creditors.  Seetion  5  concludes.
II.  PRICING  SECONLARY  MARKET  DEBT  USING  OPTION  PRICING
II.1 A Secondary  Market  Model
We develop  a more  complete  model  for  pricing  a country's  secondary
market  commercial  debt  using  option  pricing  techniques  1/.  The setup  is  the
following.  Due to  uncertainty  in  the  country's  export  earnings,  import
requirements  and  net  scheduled  capital  in-or  outflows,  the  net  amount  of
financing  available  each  period  to service  foreign  commercial  debt  is
uncertain.  The  uncertainty  in  the  amount  of resources  available  to service
foreign  obligations  can  be due  to ability  to  pay  as well  as willingness  to  pay
factors.  For  convenience,  we lump  these  factors  together  and  assume  that  the
creditors  have  appropriability  of any  resources  falling  short  of contractual
debt  service,  or,  alternatively  and  equivalently,  that  the  country  is a
perfectly  willing,  but sometimes  unable  payer.  Thus,  each  period  the  country
will  pay  as much  as its  financial  resources  allow  to  the  commercial  banks,  but
1  Option  pricing  has  been  used  before  in the  pricing  of  LDC  debt  by
Kharas  et alii (1987);  Cohen  (1989)  gives  an  analytical  solution  to the
pricing  problem  they  solve  numerically.  These  papers  focus  on the  option  a
creditor  has  to call  a default,  whereas  we focus  on the  option  the  country  has
not to  service  its  debt  in  periods  of low  foreign  exchange  availability.4
never  more than  its  contractual  obligations  in the  period.  Consequently,
repayments  may  fall  short  of commercial  debt  service  obligations  due.
We can  represent  this  repayment  behavior  by the  following:
(la) R*(t)- min (Rt,FX.)
with  Re(t)  equal  to  the  repayment  in  period  t;  R,  equals  the  contractual  debt
service  in  period  t  and  FX.  the  resources  available  to service  commercially
held  debt,  also  in  period  t. Rt  is  assumed  known,  although  it is
straightforward  to  extend  the  methodology  to stochastic  contractual  debt
service,  such  as in the  case  of floating  interest  rate  debt (see  for  instance,
Fischer  (1978)  and  Margrabe  (1978)).
(la)  can  be rearranged  to  yield:
(lb) R*(t)  -Rt  - max[O,R,  - MXt]
But  max[O,R,  - FX.J  equals  the  value  of a put,  with  a strike  price  of  Rt,
which  is  written  on the  value  of the  foreign  exchange  available,  FXt.  2/  Thus
equation  lb shows  that  the  uncertain  repayment  can  be represented  by a certain
repayment  Rt  minus  a  put,  with  a  strike  price  of  R,,  which  is  written  on the





2  The  state  variable  FX is  a non-traded  asset  and  not as  such  priced  in
the  market.  But if  the  state  variable  is  spanned  by other  traded  instruments,
one  can  price  the  non-traded  asset  and  all  results  go through  identically  as
in  the  case  of traded  assets.  See  also  section  III.5
This is  shown  graphically  in Figures  la  and  lb.  In  Figure  la,  the  shaded
area  represents  the  value  of a put  written  on  FXt  with  exercise  price  R,.  The
put  pays  max[O,Rt  - FX>]:  whenever  FXt  falls  below  Rt,  the  put is in the  money
and  its  value  is  equal  to  Rt  - FXt;  and  whenever  FX,  is  above  Rt,  the  put  is
out  of the  money  and  thus  worthless.
Figure  lb  below  shows  first  of  all  the  payment  obligation,  Rt,  which  is
independent  of FXt  and  thus  represented  by a  horizontal  line (FX  is  on the
horizontal  axis).  Subtracting  the  put (shaded  area)  from  the  fixed  payment  Rt,
yields the desired payoff function, R*t  - Rt - max[O,Rt - FXJ].  This is
represented  by the  heavy  line  in Fig.lb,  the  line  that  goes  from  the  origin
out  at  a 45-degree  angle  until  it  cuts  R,  and  then  moves  horizontally  to the
right.  For  any  outcome  of FXt  above  Rt,  full  repayment  results  and thus  R*t  -
Rt.  For  a  value  of FXt  below  Rt,  only  FX,  is  paid  and  hence  R*t  - FXt.  Thus  R*t




Now that  we have  replicated  the  payoff  stream  at  maturity,  it is  easy  to
calculate  the  current  value  of the  uncertain  payoff  stream  as the  current
value  of the  certain  future  obligation  Rt  minus  the  current  value  of the  put.
This  equals  the  discounted  value  of Rt,  exp(-rt)*Rt  (where  r is the
(continously  compounding)  interest  rate),  minus  the  current  value  P of a put
with  an exercise  price  of  Rt,  written  on FXt.  3/  If  V(Rt,  is the  present  value
of the  claim,  we can  represent  this  as:
3  The  formula  assumes  a constant  interest  rate  r  for  notational
convenience  only.  The  empirical  application  presented  below  allows  for
different  maturity  structures  of interest  rates.6
(2)  V(Rt)  - exp(-rt)*Rt  - P(FXt,Rt,r,t,a).
where  P(FXt,Rt,r,t,a)  is  the  current  value  of a put  written  on FXt  with
exercise  price  Rt,  intezest  rate  r,  maturity  t and  standard  deviation  a. If
one  furthermore  assumes  that  FX  behaves  lognormally,  the  pricing  of the  put
can  be done  using  the  Black  and  Scholes  option  pricing  formula  (see  Black  and
Scholes  (1973)).  4/  P  iS  then  equal  _o ne following  expression:
(3)  P(FXt,Rt,r,t,a)  - - FXO*exp((p-r)t)*N(dl)  + exp(-rt)R*N(d2'
where
dl - [-log(FX 0*exp(pt)/Rt)  - (a2/2)*t]/(ajt)
d2 - dl  + ajt
p  - the  drift  in  FXt  over  tha  peLiod  0..  t5/
The  current  value  of a loan  with the  series  Rt  falling  due  over  tine  is
imply  the  sum  of the  current  values  of  a series  of these  claims  over the
maturity  of the  contract.  The  present  value  VL of a series  of contractual
obligations  R.,  for  a maturity  T, is  thus  equal  to:
(4)  VL  - EtRtexp(-rt)  - EtP(FXt,Rt,r,t,a)
where  Rt  can  be different  for  each  period  depending  on the  terms  on the  loan
and  the  summation  is  over  t-l,..,T.  Note that  this  implies  that  we can  study
the  implications  of different  maturity  structures  on the  price  of  debt,
something  which  in  most  other  pricing  models  by assumDtion  does  not  affect  the
price  of debt.
II.2 Pricing  Exit  Bonds  with  Fixed  Guarantees
Thp  methodology  explained  above  can  also  be used  to price  guarantees
that  are  provided  by a third  party  for  a specific  payment  falling  due  at a
specific  maturity  date.  Assume  that  the  third  party  provides  a guarantee  for
full  payment  of K at maturity  date  r.  Following  a similar  line  of  reasoning,
one  can  represent  the  guarantee  as a  put  option  with  an exercise  price  of K, a
maturity  date  r  and  written  on  an underlying  asset  FX.  Such  a  put  can  again  be
priced  using  the  Black  and  Scholes  formula:
(5)  VFG - P(FX,,K,,r,r,a)
4  Other  dens  ,  functions  can  easily  be incoporated  using  numerical
integration  techniques.
5  The formula  assumes  a  constant  drift  p for  notational  convenience
only.  The  empirical  application  presented  below  allows  for  time  varying  drift
parameter  p. The  valuation  formula  differs  from  the  Black-Scholes  equation  in
that  we do not  assume  p-r.7
Define  the  set  of years  r over  which  guarantees  are  provided  as ('T);
furthermore,  assume  for  simplicity  that  K,  - R,  for  all  re(r').  Then the  value
of such  a set  of guarantees  equals:
(6)  VFG - E:,,)?(FX,,RT,r,r,O)
and  the  value  of the  loan  with this  set  of guarantees  attached  becomes:
(7)  VL.FG  - LtRtexp(-rt)  - EtP(FX,tRt,r,t,a)  +  E{.)P(FXX,, R,,r,r,a)
Any  type  of fixed  guarantee,  whether  of  principal  or interest  and  whether
single  or  multiple  years,  can  be priced  using  this  methodology.
II.3 Pricing  Exit  Bonds  with  Rolling  Interest  Guarantees
A bond  with  rolling  guarantees  can  also  be priced  using  the  same  option
pricing  methodology.  Assume  the  following  rules.  The  guarantee  is  at time  zero
extended  for  coverage  of one  year  of interest.  If the  country  remains  current
on the  guaranteed  obligation,  the  guarantee  will  be extended  for  another  year,
and  so on.  6/  In terms  of our  model,  the  guarantee  will cover  next  year's  debt
service  obligation  provided  the  foreign  exchange  available  in  each  of the
previous  periods  was  above  the  debt  service  obligation  of the  corresponding
year.  As before,  it is  assumed  that  in  case  of  partial  repayment  the
claimholders  acquire  all  the  foreign  exchange  available  in  this  period  if it
falls  below  the  debt  service  obligation  and  can  at most  retain  their  debt
service  obligation  if  the  -tate  of  nature  is  better  this  period.
In  period  one  the  repayment  of  R1 is  assured  through  the  guarantee,
implying  that  the  current  value  of the  debt  service  obligation  is
exp(-rtl)*Rl.  In period  two  the  repayment  is  assured  provided  the  country  did
not  default  in  period  one  on its  obligation,  in  which  case  the  guarantee  would
have  been  called.  If  however  the  guarantee  was  called,  the  repayment  in  period
two  will  be min[FX 2,R 2] as under  the  regular  claim  without  any  guarantee.  This
implies  that  the  current  value  of the  second  period  obligation  will  be equal
to exp(-rt 2)*R 2 minus  the  current  value  of  a put  on  FX2 with exercise  price
R2, plus  a  put  which  is  conditional  on the  guarantee  not  being  called  the
first  period  PC:
(8)  V(R2)RG  - exp(-rt 2)*R 2 - P(FX 2,R2,r,t,a)  + PC(FX 2,R2,r,t,a)
The  first  two  terms  are  equal  to the  standard  expression  for  a claim  on a
country,  the  contractual  obligation  discounted  minus  the  value  of a put.  The
third  term  represents  the  value  of the  guarantee,  which  is the  value  of a put
conditional  on  no prior  calls  so that  the  guarantee  is indeed  effective.  If
FXt  is serially  independent  over  time,  an assumption  we make,  the  pricing  of
this  last  conditional  put is  particularly  simple  and  yields:
(9)  PC(FX2 ,R2 ,r,t,a)  - 0(2,R 1,FXj,a)*P(FX 2,R2,r,t,a)
6  The  pricing  is  done  for  a guarantee.  Identical  results  obtain  for  an
escrow  account  as long  as the  interest  earnings  on the  escrow  account  are  not
retained  in the  account.8
where  (1(2,R 1,FX 1,o)  is the  probabil'--y  tha'  the  guarantee  is  not  called  prior
to time  2.  The  value  of the  put  which  is  conditional  on no  prior  call
simplifies  to the  value  of an  unconditional  put  multiplied  by the  probability
of  no prior  call in  any  previous  periods.  Similar  expressions  follow  for  later
periods.
Multigeriod  Guarantees
More  general  expressions  for  N-period  rolling  guarantees  can  easily  be
derived  using  similar  methodology.  For  an  N-year  rolling  guarantee,  the  first
N repayments  are  fully  guaranteed  and  thus  valued  without  any  credit  risk
discount.  The  claim  value  for  period  N+l  is the  discounted  contractual  value
minus  the  value  of an  unconditional  put,  plus  the  value  of tne  guarantee.  The
value  of the  guarantee  in that  period  equals  the  value  of a  put  which  is
conditional  on less  than  N calls  in the  preceding  N periods.  This last  put
option  can similarly  be priced  as the  conditional  put  derived  for  the  one-year
rolling  guarantee.  The  only  difference  is  that,  for  a N-period  rolling
guarantee,  n  now  refers  to the  cumulative  probability  of at  most  N-1  prior
calls.
It is  convenient  to index  0 by the  number  of years  covered  by the
rolling  guarantee:  ON.  Define,  furthermore,  WN(t)  as the  amount  left in  the
guarantee  fund  at the  start  of  year t,  expressed  in  number  of  years  of
interest  covered,  for  a fund  that  originally  covered  N  years.  Thus the
following  holds  by definition:
(10)  N(t)  > 0 for  t  ?  N
ANat  time  t  depends  on all  R and  FX  of the  periods  preceding  t. Call  (t')  the
set  of t'  preceding  t. From  the  definition  of  ON and  SN  it is  clear  that:
(11)  ON(t,R{t.l,FX{t.),a)  - Prob(fN(t)  >  0)
(10)  and (11)  together  imply:
(12) ON(t,R{t.},FX{t,},a)  - 1  for  t  s  N
< 1 for  t  > N and  a  >  0
Martin  and  van  Wijnbergen  (1989)  show  that  the  value  of  QN(t,R(t.,)FXpt..,a)  can
be derived  using  a simple  recursion  formula  in  conjunction  with  the  initial
conditions  in (12).  This  recursion  formula  greatly  simplifies  the  numerical
analysis  and  is incorporated  in the  computer  programs  used for  the  empirical
analysis  presented  below.
With all  this  machinery  developed,  one  can  express  the  increment  of the
value  of rolling  guarantees  with  N years  coverage  over  the  value  of a  N-year
fixed  guarantee:
(13)  VL,RG.N - VL,FG-N - Et.N  nN(t,R(t0)FX(t,},)*P(FXt,Rt,r,t,a)
2-  09
with  obvious  definitions  of  VLRG.N and  VL .G-N.  Also,  Rt  in  equ. (13)  should  be
undarstood  to only  include  interest  payments.  The inequality  in (13)  shows
that,  for  the  creditors,  rolling  guarantees  are  at  worst  of equal  value  to a
corresponding  fixed  interest  guarantee;  and  if there  is any  positive
QN(t,R(t.),FX{te),a)  for  t>N,  even  if  only  one,  rolling  guarantees  are  strictly
preferable  from  the  creditors'  point  of  view  over  fixed  length  guarantees  with
similar  coverage.
Equ.(13)  suggests  that  the  incremental  value  of switching  from  fixed  to
rolling  guarantees  is influenced  by the  initial  level  of debt  Do,  through  the
impact  of Do  on Rt.:
(14)  S(VL,RG-N - VL,FG  N)/ 61)O
Et,N  6(N(t,R(t,),FX(t,),a)/6Do*P(FXt,Rttr,t,a)  < 0
+  ZtN fN(t,R{t.),FX{t,),o)*6P(FXt,Rt,r,t,O)/6DO  > 0
The  first  set  of terms  is  negative  since  higher  debt  and thus  high-r  RL
implies  greater  credit  ri'- t and thus  smaller  fl;  the  fund  is  more likely  to  be
exhausted  at any  given  ti.-  beyond  period  N. However  the  second  term  is
positive,  since  the  value  of the  put  increases  with  an increase  in the
striking  price  Rt.  The  net  effect  is  a  priori  ambiguous  and  thus  needs  to  be
addressed  empirically  (cf.  Section  III).
II.4  Pricing  Bonds  with  RecaRture  Clauses
The  methodology  used  above  is  also  easily  extended  to account  for  the
possibility  of recapture  clauses,  where  future  payments  obligations  depend  in
some  fashion  on the  amount  of foreign  exchange  available  in  each  individual
period.  Assume,  for  instance,  that  in  exchange  for  a certain  amount  of debt
reduction  at time  zero,  the  creditors  receive  o  recapture  clause  which
entitles  them,  whenever  foreign  exchange  exceed!  a certain  level  L, to  a share
a  of the  excess  foreign  exchange  over  L in  every  period  after  time  T.  Assume
further  that  the  maximum  amount  tha%,.  creditors  can  receive  per  period  under
this  sharing  rule is  limited  by an amount  M. 7/  The  Mexican  debt  package
negotiated  in the  summer  of 1989  contains  a similar  sharing  rule.
Such  a sharirg  rule  can  easily  be represented  in  terms  of option
terminology:  the  creditors  hold,  in  addition  to their  regular  claim,  a
fraction  a  of a series  of calls  that  are  written  on FX  with  exercise  prices  L,
maturity  dates  r+l,  r+2,..,T,  and  are  short  a fraction  a of  a series  of calls
that  are  written  on FX  with  excercise  price  U-L+M/a  and  maturity  date  r+1,
r+2,..,T.
To see  the  equivalence  between  the  sha-e  g rule  and  the  portfolio  of
options  just  described,  consider  the  payoff  scructure  for  the  recapture
clause,  which  we call  I.
7  L, M and  a  can  be made  time  dependent.  In  addition,  L, M and  a can  be
made  dependent  on other  stochastic  variables,  such  as  world  inflation  rates  in
case  of indexed  clauses;  in that  case,  one  needs  to use  the  stochastic  option
pricing  formula  of Fischer  (1978)  and  Margrabe  (1978).10
(15) I  -,.,  max[amax[FXq,.)-L,0],M]
-.>,a*(max[FX(,.)-L,O]  - max[FX% 1.)-U,O]);  U-L+M/a
The  expressions  in tae  two  brackets  in the  last  equation  are  the  two
calls  mentioned  above,  with  exercise  prices  L and  U-L+M/a.  The  value  of the
calls  can  once  again  be evaluated  using  the  Black-Scholes  formula.  Alternative
recapture  clauses,  whir',  may  dep id  in  a more  complicated  manner  on FX,  can  be
handled  similarly.
III  SECONDARY  MARKET  PRICING  t  D  THE  VALUE  OF  GUARPANTEES:  MEXICO  1989
In this  Section,  we first  assess  the  characteristics  of the  stochastic
process  governing  foreign  exchange  availability  in  Mexico.  The results  are
used in  an analysis  of the  detetm.inants  of s6condary  market  prices.  We then
assess  the  valuation  of different  forms  of interest  guarantees  (fixed  versus
"rolling"  guarantees).  This  is  done  within  the  context  of  Mexico's  situation
mid-1989.  Section  IV  analyses  the  Mexican  debt  package  negotiated  over the
summer  of 1989.
III.1 Behavior  of Foreign  Exchange  Available
The availability  of foreign  exchange  to service  Mexico's  commercial  bank
debt  depends  predominantly  on the  behavior  of  Mexico's  non-interest  current
account,  which  in turn  depends  to a large  extent  on the  behavior  of oil  export
earnings.  Thus the  variability  of the  financial  resources  available  to  service
external  debt  is in  the  case  of  Mexico  predominantly  a result  of the
uncertainty  of the  price  of  oil.  Even  though  the  foreign  exchange  earnings  of
Mexico  are  non-traded  assets,  and  as such  not  priced  directly  in the  market,
they  are  li.Aely  spanned  by assets  which  are  traded  and  whose  current  values
are  known.  For  example,  Mexico's  oil  earnings  can  easily  be spanned  through
forward  or futures  contracts  traded  on  over-the-counter  and  exchange  markets
Consequently,  the  pricing  methodology  underlying  the  option  valuation,  which
assumed  traded  assets,  can  be used.
The  behavior  of  Mexico's  future  oil  earnings  will  depend  on price
behavior  and  expected  quantity.  It is  projected  that  the  quantity  of oil
produced  will  remain  at its  current  level  over  the  near  future  (1.2  million
barrels  per  day)  and  will  decrease  in the  late  1990s  (to  0.8  million  barrels  a
day).  The standard  deviation  of the  average  price  of Mexican  oil  over  the  last
8 years  has  been  23%.  Similar  standard  deviations  are  observed  for  prices  that
are  close  substitutes  of  Mexican  oil,  such  as  Borneo  light  (25%  over  87-89),
and  for  the  average  OPEC  oil  price  (40%  over  87-89,  21 percent  over  85-89).
The  standard  deviation  of the  annual  changes  in  most (nominal)  oil  prices  over
the  period  1975-1988  has  been  at least  20%  annually.  Correcting  for  any  trend
in  oil  prices  does  not  change  these  estimates  significantly.
Another  way to get  an estimate  of expected  standard  deviation  is  to  use
market  information,  such  as actual  prices  of  oil  options.  Given  a pricing
model,  observed  option  prices  can  be used  to  back  out  volatilities  that  are
consistent  with  those  prices.  Doing  that  one  finds  that  the  historical
estimates  of the  standard  deviation  of oil  prices  are  in fact  consistent  with
those  implied  by the  prices  of  options  on  oil  traded  on  exchanges.  Using  thc11
Black  and  Scholes  formula  on recent  option  prices  implies  volatilities  of
around  20%.  Thus  historical  values  for  the  volatility  of oil  prices  closely
ajpproximate  the  market's  assessment  of future  volatility.  We therefcre  use the
historical  volatility  in  our  pricing  exercise.  8/
Commercial  banks  claims  are  de facto  junior  to  many  other  claims  on
Mexico,  e.g.  official  sector  claims  and  bonds.  Thus,  the  resources  available
to  service  the  commercial  debt  have to  be determined  after  these  other
creditors  are  serviced.  This implies  that  amount  of foreign  exchange  available
for  commercial  bank  debt  servicing  contains  a component  which  is dependent  on
oil  revenues  and  another,  more  deterministic  part.  The  following  procedure  is
therefore  used.  First,  the  non-oil,  non-interest  current  account  is  projected
in  a deterministic  fashion.  The  projections  are  based  on the  model  reported  in
van  Wijnbergen  (1989)  and  van  Wijnbergen  and  Pena  (1989).  Second,  the  non-oil,
non-interest  current  account  is  adjusted  for  debt  service  to  more senior  claim
holders,  for  foreign  direct  investment  flows  and  for  capital  account
transactions  such  as resetve  accumulation  (see  van  vlijnbergen  and  Pena  (1989)
for  details).  Third,  oil  earnings  are  added  to the  flow,  thus  introducing  the
stochastic  element  in  FXt.
III.2  Secondary  Market  Pricing
Using  the  option  pricing  model  outlined  above,  we calculated  the  value
of existing  commercial  bank  claims  on  Mexico.  At the  "base  case"  values  for
the  distribution  of FXt  and  a2, the  model  predicts  that  the  secondary  ma-:ket
price  of the  part  of  Mexico's  commercial  debt  under  negotiation  in 1989  ($52.7
bUS),  is 37  cents  before  any  debt  reduction.  The  secondary  market  price  in
February,  1989,  just  before  the  Brady  plan  was  proposed,  was in fact  around
that  value.
The  matrix  below  ptesents  prices  for  alternative  combinations  of foreign
exchange  expected  to  be available  to service  commercial  bank  held  debt  and
different  degrees  of  uncertainty  regarding  these  expected  values.  The  bold
numbers  in the  matrix  represent  combinations  of the  expected  present  value  of
foreign  exchange  available  (PV(FX))  and  oAl  price  variance  a2 that  yield  a
valuation  close  to the  pre-Brady  price,  between  35 and  40 cents  on the  dollar.
8  Consistent  with  our  assumption  of no serially  dependence  of FXt,  we
modelled  in  the  application  not the  uncertainty  in the  change  in the  price  of
oil  but instead  the  uncertainty  in  the  level  of the  price  of oil.  The standard
deviation  of annual  changes  in  the  price  of oil  is therefore  converted  into
the  standard  deviation  of (the  logarithm  of)  the  price  of oil.12
Table  1:  Secondary  Market  Price  as a function  of  PV(FX)  and  02
IPX  \  a2 0.25  0.36  0.49
0.75  0.37  0.31  0.26
1.00  0.43  0.37  0.31
1.25  0.49  0.41  0.35
Note:  PV(FX)  is  presented  as a share  of the  base  case  value  and  variances  are
expressed  relative  to the  logarithm  of the  oil  price.
The  Table  demonstrates  the  sensitivity  of the  secondary  market  price  to
the  expected  value  and  the  variance  of resources  to service  commercial  debt.
Consider  the  impact  of the  variance  first.  The  value  of  any  put increases  with
the  degree  of  uncertainty:
(16) 6p/5a 2 _ FX  t*/t*N'  > 0,
Thus,  since  the  secondary  market  value  equals  the  discounted  face  value  minus
the  value  of a  put, the  value  of the  claim  decreases  as uncertainty  increases,
something  Table  1 confirms.  The  Table  also  demonstrates  that  the  value  of the
put falls  with  the  initial  value  of the  underlying  asset;  therefore,  and  not
surprizingly,  the  secondary  market  evaluation  in  fact  rises  with  a  higher
expected  ability  to  pay.
Figure  2 illustrates  the  impact  of the  structtre  of payments  on
secondary  market  evaluation,  something  that  cannot  be assessed  with  most
existing  models  of  debt  pricing.  The  figure  shows  the  within  period  price  of a
claim  falling  due  in that  period;  this  within  period  price  can  be derived  from
formula  (2)  by dividing  through  the  discounted  face  value  of the  claim  falling
due  in  year  t:
(17) P..,(t)  - (exp(-rt)*Rt  - P(FXt,R,,r,t,a))/(exp(-rt)*Rt)
1  - P(FXt,Rt,r,t,a)*exp(rt)/Rt
The  figure  shows  the  P...(t)  associated  with the  original  amount  of debt
under  negotiation  in 1989,  $52.7  bUS,  but  with  the  amortization  assumed  due  as
a  bullet  payment  at the  end  of thirty  years.  P. 0c(t)  declines  gradually  over
time  because  uncertainty  increases  as time  progresses;  this  increases  the
value  of the  put  constituting  the  discount  and  thus  depresses  the  price.  This
gradual  decline  would  seem  to lend  some  respectability  to the  practice  of
using  a risk-adjusted  discount  rate.  That  respectability  is lost,  however,
once  we look  at the  last  period,  the  period  in  which  the  bullet  payment  comes
due.  Using  a risk-adjusted  discount  rate  implies  a declining  probability  to
repay,  but one  that  is independent  of the  amount  due in  any  given  period.  Thus
there  is  no difference  in  valuation,  using  that  method,  between  a period  in
which  scheduled  debt  service  just  consists  of $5  bUS  in interest,  and  a period
in  which,  in  addition,  over  $50  bUS  principal  comes  due.  But  Figure  2  shows
what  common  sense  would  also  suggest,  that  such  a large  difference  in
scheduled  debt  service  has a  major  impact  on relative  valuation.  P..c(t),13
which  was falling  gradually  at less  than  one  point  per  period,  suddenly  drops
by 11  points  in  the  period  in  which  the  bullet  payment  is  due.
FIG.2  Within-Perlod  Market  Va lue  PsecCt)
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The impact  of the  size  of an  obligation  on its  relative  value  explains
something  that  one  misses  using  risk  adjusted  rates,  the  importance  of full
collateralization  of  principal  in any  exchange  offer.  With  a repayment
probability  independent  of the  size  of the  obligation,  such  collateralization
seems  inefficient;  it ties  up funds  for  an  event  that  takes  place  so far  in
the  future  so as to  be of little  importance.  Fig.  2  shows  that,  while
collateralization  guarantees  a  payment  far  in  the  future,  it could  still  be
valuable  and  an efficient  use  of  enhancement  resources  because  the  credit  risk
in  the  bullet  period  is so  much  larger  than  in  other  periods.  The  impact  of
the  size  of an obligation  on its  relative  value  is also  clear  from  the  line  in
Figure  2  which  depicts  the  P...(t)  in  case  the  contractual  interest  payments
are  halved.  The  relative  values  P.,,C(t)  are  considerably  higher.
One  can  derive  the  secondary  market  price  of  a bond  from  the  series  ot
within-period  valuations  P,..(t)  as follows:
(18)  Pec,L-  Et  P,,,(t)*Rte-rt/(Et  Rte-rt)
Figure  3 shows  the  sensitivity  of this  secondary  market  price  with  respect  to
the  amount  of  debt.  This  figure  is  especially  illustrative  since  it  can  show
the  effects  of debt  reduction  on the  secondary  market  price,  something  other
models  did  not account  for.  A debt  service  reduction  of 50  percent  for
instance,  increases  the  price  from  37  cts  to  50  cts.  As a  consequence,  the  50%
debt  reduction  does  reduce  the  market  value,  from  $19.3  billion  to  $13.2
billion,  but  by 32%  only,  much less  than  50%.  The  difference  between  the  50%14
face  value  reduction  and the  32%  reduction  in  market  value  is  caused  by the
increase  in unit  value  from  37 cts  to  50 cts.
FIG.3
Secondary  Market  Value  versus  Discount
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The  next exercise  demonstrates  the  impact  of  seniority.  Consider  a
package  not  unlike  the  one  Mexico  negotiated  mid 1989  (cf.  Section  IV for
details):  creditors  can  choose  between  an exchange  offer  for  an  exit  bond  at
35%  discount,  or a  new  money  commitment  of 25%  over  the  original  claims,
spread  out  over  four  years  (7%,6%,6%,6%).  Assume,  moreover,  that  the  debt  with
the  new  money  calls  attached  is  officially  recognized  as  junior  to the  exit
bond.  Of course,  the  respective  valuation  of the  two  options  depends  on how
much  of the  original  debt  is  brought  under  each  of the  two  options.  Take  as  a
benchmark  80%  exchanged  at a 35%  discount  and  20%  new  money.
The  model  predicts  a secondary  market  price  of the  new  exit  bond  of 49
cents  per dollar  of new  face  value,  up from  the  old  price  of 37  cts/$.
However,  this  ignores  the  35%  discount  granted  at the  time  of the  exchange  of
the  old  instrument  for  the  new.  Once  the  discount  is taken  into  account  (by
expressing  the  value  of the  new  claims  as  a percentage  of the  old,  pre-
discount  face  value),  the  unit  value  drops  by 35%  to 32  cts/$.  This is  however
still  in  excess  of the  projected  value  of the  new  money  claims.  These  claims
are  valued  at no  more than  26 cts/$  in  the  configuration  used  in this
exercise,  although  they  carry  exactly  the  same  interest  rate  as the  new  bonds.
The 6  cts/$  difference  in  price  is  exclusively  due  to the  lack  of seniority  of
the  new  money  claims.15
In  the  next  section  we discuss  what  happens  if the  bonds  derive  their
value  in  excess  of  a regular  claim  on the  country  not  only  from  seniority  but
in  addition  from  the  guarantees  provided  on (parts)  of interest  payments  and
principal.
III.3  Valuation  of  Fixed  Interest  Guarantees
The  value  of a fixed  guarantee  on any  payment  for  a specific  year  was
shown  above  to  be equal  to the  value  of a  put  with  an exercise  price  equal  to
the  payment.  In  other  words,  a fixed  guarantee  on a year's  interest  payments
just  cancels  the  within  period  secondary  market  discount  (1-P...(t))  in the
year  the  guarantee  applies.  Fig.  4 indicates  the  value  of a fixed  interest
guarantee  for  a range  of  years.  The figure  is  based  on a 30-year  bond  with
bullet  payment  due  in the  last  year  and  lists  the  difference  in  market  value
of a  bond  with  and  without  a given  number  of  years  in  which  interest  payments
are  up-front  guaranteed,  as a function  of that  number  of  years  and  as a
percentage  of the  market  value  without  interest  guarantees:  (VLF-VL)/VL.
FIG.4  VALUE  OF  FIXED  GUARANTEES
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'.ne  value  of a fixed  guarantee  depends  on the  likelihood  of  non-
performance  in  a given  year  and  hence  on the  amount  of  debt  service  due in
that  year.  Thus,  any  reduction  in  cuntractual  values  will lower  the  value  of a
fixed  guarantee.  This  can  be seen  in  Fig.4.  The  higher  line  indicates  the
value  of guarantees  as  a function  of the  number  of  years  guaranteed  for  a  bond
with  $52.7  bUS principal;  the  lower  line  gives  the  value  of guarantees  as a16
function  of the  number  of years  covered  for  a similarly  structured  bond,  but
after  a  50%  discount  on  principal.  The  value  of the  guarantees,  as  a
percentage  of the  value  of the  now  much  smaller  bond  with interest  guarantees,
drops  by almost  two  thirds  as the  discounted  claim  is  much  more  assured  to
begin  with.
III.4  The  Value  of  Rolling  Interest  Guarantees
To assess  the  incremental  value  of rolling  over  fixed  length  guarantees,
compare  a fixed  length  and  a rolling  guarantee,  both  with  N years  of interest
coverage.  Equation  (13)  shows  that  a rolling  guarantee  is  always  worth  more  to
creditors  as long  as there  is  positive  probability,  however  small,  that  the
guarantee  will  be called  by less  than  N times  in  the  first  N years.
The superiority  of  rolling  guarantees  over  fixed  guarantees  is
demonstrated  in  Figure  5; this  figure  lists  the  incremental  value  of rolling
over  fixe.i  guarantees  as  a percentage  of the  market  value  of the  unguaranteed
instrument,  (VLR-VLF)/VL.  The  instrument  guaranteed  is  a 30-year  bond  with  a
bullet  payment  of principal  at the  end.  The  lower  line  assumes  the  face  value
of the  bond  equals  the  entire  debt  under  negotiation,  $52.7  bUS;  the  higher
line  is  based  or.  a 50%  discount  for  a bond  with face  value  of $26.4  bUS.
The  diagram  shows  that  the  incremental  value  of the  rolling  guarantee
increases  with the  number  of years  covered,  but  at an increasingly  slower
rate.  This is  because  extra  years  provide  benefits  that  are  increasingly
further  in the  future  and  hence  discounted  more  heavily.
FIG.5  INCREMENTAL  VALUE  OF ROLLING  G'JARANTEES










Nfmof  YeaLrs  Guarante
0  DISM0.0  4.  O=0  1-.  517
The  diagram  also  sheds  light  on the  impact  of debt  relief  on the
incremental  value  of rolling  guarantees,  an impact  that  is theoretically
ambiguous  (cf.  Equ.(14)  in Section  II.3).  In  the  case  and  numbers  under
consideration  here,  the  net  impact  is  positive:  more  debt  relief  increases  the
incremental  value  of rolling  guarantees.  Evidently  the  effect  through  the
derivative  of  Nf  dominates  the  effect  due  to  the  reduction  in face  value.  With
more  debt  relief,  Mexico  would  become  a  better  credit  risk,  which  diminishes
the  incremental  value  of rolling  guarantees.  But  at  the  same  time,  the  chance
that  there  is anything  left  in the  fund  in  any  given  year  after  N is greater
and  this  increases  the  incremental  value  of rolling  guarantees.  Figure  5  shows
that  the  latter  effect  dominates.  Debt  relief  itself  increases  the  incremental
value  of rolling  over  fixed  guarantees.
IV  MEXICO'S  1989  EXTERNAL  DEBT  AGREEMENT
In this  Section  we demonstrate  the  power  of the  methods  developed
through  an assessment  of the  debt  package  concluded  between  Mexico  and its
creditors  in the  summer  of 1989.
IV.1 Outline  of the  July  1989  Debt  Agreement
On  July 23  Mexico  and its  commercial  creditors  reached  a tentative
agreement  on a restructuring  of  part  of  Mexico's  external  debt.  The  package
tentatively  agreed  upon  covers  the  debt  under  the  Restructuring  agreements,
the  1983-84  Credit  Agreements  (New  Money  Loans),  and  the  1987  Multi-Facility
agreement.  This  amounts  to  $52.7  billion.  Creditor  banks  holding  credits  under
these  facilities  are  presented  with  a menu  of options  including  two  debt  and
debt  service  reduction  facilities,  and  a  new  money  facility.  Banks  can  choose
to participate  through  any  combination  of the  new  money  and  debt  relief
options.  The three  options  are:
A  Discount  bonds,  to  be exchanged  against  existing  debt  at 35%  discount;
B  Pa.  bonos,  exchanged  at  par  but  carrying  a 6.25%  fixed  interest  rate;
C  Nejw  money,  at LIBOR  plus  13/16,  with  a  7 year  grace  period  and  tenor  of
15  years;  the  commitment  should  equal  25%  of the  amount  brought  under  this
option.  Disbursement  will  be 7%  at effectiveness  and  6% each  in 1990,  1991
and 1992.
On the  discount  and  par  bonds,  principal  will  be fully  secured,  in
addition  to at least  18  months  of interest  coverage  through  an escrow  account
(rolling  guarantee).  If  sufficient  funds  are  available,  interest  coverage  will
be increased  up to 24  months.  Banks  holding  loans  contracted  in  the  1983-88
period  will reschedule  them  with  7  years  grace  and  15 years  maturity  to the
extent  they  are  not  swapped  for  par or  discount  bonds.
Banks  choosing  the  debt  relief  options  A and  B are  eligible  for
recovering  some  of the  money  given  up through  a "recaRture  clause".  Under  this
clause,  beginning  July  1996,  30%  of the  extra  oil  revenues  Mexico  gets  if the
price  of oil  rises  above  $14  per  barrel  (to  be adjusted  for  US inflation),
will  accrue  to the  banks  that  have granted  debt  service  relief.  This  amount  is
in  no year to  exceed  3% of the  nominal  value  of  the  debt  exchanged  for  these
bonds  at the  time  of the  exchange  (i.e.  there  is  no indexation  of this  cap).18
The  amount  available  under  this  clause  will  be scaled  back  by the  percentage
of the  total  debt  brought  under  the  two  debt  relief  options.
IV.2 Debt  Relief
Table  1 summarizes  the  element  of debt  relief  embedded  in  each  of the
three  options  the  commercial  banks  can  choose  between.  We also  list  debt
relief  if  a combination  of 54%  interest  reduction,  20%  principal  reduction  and
26%  new  money  is  chosen.
Table  2:  DEBT  RELIEF  IMPLIED  BY  THE  THREE  OPTIONS
(percentage  of face  value)
Debt  Relief  Percentage:
Without  Recapture  With  Recapture
New  Money  0  0
Interest  reduction  28  25
Principal  reduction  35  32
54%  IR/20%  PR/26%  NM  22  20
Note:  Debt  relief  is  defined  as the  reduction  in  the  discounted  value  of  debt
service  as a  percentage  of the  face  value  of the  outstanding  debt.
Of course,  new  money  implies  no debt  relief,  but  offers  the  highest
immediate  reduction  in  net  transfers.  The  principal  reduction  option  involves
35%  debt  relief,  since  the  mark-up  on LIBOR  will  not  be changed  under  this
scenario.  Evaluated  at current  interest  rate  projections,  the  low  interest
rate  option  implies  28%  debt  relief.  This  number  is sensitive  to the
projections  used  for  international  interest  rates.  To calculate  debt  relief,
we use  a LIBOR  of 8.5%  for  the  remainder  of 1989  and  for  1990,  and  8% for  the
remaining  28  years.  The  two  debt  relief  options  are  equivalent  in terms  of
implied  debt  relief  if  LIBOR  would  stay  at 9.1%  for  the  next  thirty  years.
However,  the  interest  reduction  option  provides  more  than  debt  service
relief.  Because  the  interest  rate  on this  exit  instrument  will  be fixed,  it
also  provides  insurance  against  interest  rate  fluctuations.
Furthermore,  comparison  of the  new  money  option  with  the  debt  relief
options  is influenced  by the  fact  that  the  latter  qualify  for  the  recapture
clause  and  the  new  money  option  does  not.  The  value  of these  provisions
depends  both on  expected  future  oil  prices  and  on the  variability  of these
prices.  Thus  any  evaluation  needs  explicitly  to incorporate  the  impact  of
uncertainty  on the  expected  cost  of this  clause;  evaluating  the  impact  of the
recapture  clause  on debt  service  obligations  at some  point  estimate  of future
oil  prices  is  not  enough.  Estimates  using  the  methodology  of Section  2 and
market  information  on the  pricing  of  oil  options  suggest  that  the  recapture
clause  is  worth  about  3%  of the  amount  brought  under  the  debt  relief  options.
Thus,  the  debt  relief  would  be reduced  as indicated  in  Table  2. In  absolute
amounts,  this  would  imply  $1.6  billion  less  debt  relief  if the  54/20/26
division  is  chosen.19
IV.3 Attractiveness  of the  Various  ORtions  for  the  Creditors
The final  impact  of the  package  on debt  relief  and  creditworthiness
indicators  depends  on the  particular  nix  chosen  by tha  creditors.  It is thus
of interest  to  assess  the  factors  likely  to  influence  that  choice.  Four
factors  are  likely  to dominate.  First,  Mexican  credit  risk  and  the  extent  to
which  different  instruments  are  affected  differently.  Second,  for  given  credit
risk,  the  amount  of debt  relief  embedded  in  each  of the  three  options.  Third,
the  extent  to  which  different  instruments  are  "enhanced"  throught  the  use  of
official  moneys  in the  form  of collateralization,  direct  guarantees  or arms'
length  guarantees  through  escrow  accounts.  Fourth,  the  tax  and  regulatory
treatment  of the  income  and  balan'Ae  sheet  consequences  of any  option.
The impact  of tax  and  regu'atory  treatment  does  not  allow  for  a general
discussion.  This is  country-specific,  and  may  even  depend  on the  particular
profit-and-loss  and  balance  sheet  situation  of  an individual  creditor.
However,  the  impact  of the  first  three  factors,  credit  risk,  debt relief  and
credit  enhancement,  on the  value  of the  new instruments  can  be assessed
without  entering  details  specific  to  particular  creditor  countries  or even to
individual  creditors.  The results  of such  an evaluation  are  presented  in  Table
3.  This table  summarizes  the  projected  secondary  market  valuation  of the
different  instrumencs,  assuming  that  they  are  chosen  in  a 54/20/26  mix  between
interest  reduction,  principal  reduction  and  new  money.  The  Table  lists  the
expected  value,  as a  percentage  of face  value,  with  and  without  enhancements,
based  on the  model  presented  in  the  preceding  Sections.
Table  3  Proiected  Secondary  Market  Valuation  of the  New Instruments
Without  enhancements; With  scheduled  enhancements;
Percentage Perc.  of new  Perc.  of new  Perc.  of old
chosen  face  value  face  value  face  value
IR  0.54  0.34  0.44  0.44
PR  0.20  0.50  0.61  0.40
NM  0.26  0.25  0.25  0.25
IR :  Interest  Rate  Reduction
PR :  Principal  Reduction
NM :  New  Money
Enhancement  for  IR,PR  options:  18  months  rolling  interest  guarantee,
full  collateralization  principal
The  Table  suggests  that  as a percentage  of the  new  face  value  and
without  any  enhancement,  the  principal  reduction  exit  bond  would  be quoted  at
the  highest  price,  because  it receives  market  interest  rates  as opposed  to
6.25%  fixed.  With interest  coverage  as stipulated  in the  tentative  agreement,
the  value  would  increase  further.  The  low-interest  instrument  would  trade  for
less,  simply  because  it  carries  a lower  interest  rate.
However,  the  unit  value  of the  new  claims  is  not  the  only  factor
entering  the  decision  on  which  option  to  choose.  After  all,  with principal20
reduction,  cld  claims  are  exchanged  at a 35%  discount  for  new  claims,  while
the  low  interest  bond  would  be exchanged  at  par.  To incorporate  that  discount,
the  secondary  market  valuation  needs  to  be compared  to the  oid  face  value;  in
this  way  any  discount  at the  w-ime  of the  exchange  of the  old  debt  for  the  new
instrument  is  taken  into  account.  This  reverses  the  outcome  of the  comparison:
the  low  interest  option  would  remain  the  same  with  enhancements,  since  old  and
new  face  value  are  the  same;  but the  value  of the  discount  bond,  inclusive  of
enhancements,  would  fall  by 35%.  Thus,  unless  tax  and  regulatory  matters
affect  the  two  options  differentially,  one  would  expect  commercial  creditors
to  prefer  interest  reduction  over  principal  reduction.
The  second  striking  result  in the  table  is  the  low  valuation  of the  new
money  option.  This  o,cion  has clearly  been  presented  as junior  debt  by the
Mexican  authorities,  junior  to the  exit  instruments.  This  has  a major  impact
on  valuation.  Without  subordination,  the  new  money  option  would  have traded  at
close  to  the  unenhanced,  new  face  value  quotation  of the  principal  reduction
deal,  since  it carries  market  interest  rates  too  but  no guarantees.  Its  junior
status  reduces  the  valuation  to 25  cts,  however.  This  25 cts  for  the  most
"junior"  claim  holders  is  thus  the  marginal  price  of Mexico's  debt,  almost
half the  average  price  of 44 cts,  the  price  the  model  predicts  if the  majority
indeed  goes  for  interest  rate  reduction.  44 cts  was in  fact  the  value
immediately  after  the  negotiations  ended  in  August  1989,  lending  some  credence
to these  results.
V  CONCLUSIONS
Existing  models  of secondary  market  pricing  of sovereign  debt  can  either
not  address  the  impact  of debt  reduction  on the  secondary  market  price,  or
they  cannot  address  valuation  of credit  enhancements.  Both issues  are  not  only
of intrinsic  interest,  but  also  of great  practical  importance  in  the  voluntary
debt  reduction  exercises  that  form  the  core  of the  current  Brady  initiative.
The  voluntary  nature  requires  that  the  enhanced  new  debt  instruments  should
have a  market  value  at least  as  high  as the  market  value  of the  old
instruments.  But  in that  set  up,  answers  to  both  questions  raised  at the
beginning  of this  paragraph  can  assist  in  assessing  how  much  credit
enhancement  is  necessary  to  make  a  certain  amount  of debt  relief  acceptable  to
creditors.  Or, if  the  sequence  of  events  is such  that  the  moneys  available  for
credit  enhancement  are  known  before  the  amount  of debt  relief  granted,  the
answers  to  these  questions  -an  assist  in finding  out  how  much  debt  relief
should  be expected  for  given  enhancement  moneys.
The  model  developed  in  this  paper  was  designed  to  shed  light  on the
determinants  of secondary  market  prices  and  the  likely  impact  on  valuation  of
different  debt  reduction  strategies  and  forms  of enhancements.  The technique
used is  option  pricing.  The  model  was  used to  demonstrate  that  debt  reduction
has  a  substantial  impact  on the  value  of those  claims  that  remain.  We also
assess  the  value  of fixed  and  rolling  guarantees.  In  particular,  we prove
theoretically  and  demonstrate  empirically  that  from  the  creditors'  point  of
view  rolling  guarantees  dominate  fixed  guarantees  as a technique  of credit
enhancement.  We furthermore  explore  the  impact  of  debt  relief  on the
incremental  value  of rolling  guarantees  over  fixed  guarantees.  Also,  the  model
was  used  to assess  empirically  the  value  of seniority.21
The final  section  provides  a  preliminary  assessment  of the  debt
restructuring  agreement  recently  reached  between  Mexico  and  its  commercial
creditors.  The  three  options  are  not  equivalent  if  the  newly  created  bonds  are
senior  to the  new  money  option.  We show  that  the  terms  of the  two  exit  bonds
are  such  that  their  market  value  is likely  to  be close  to the  pre-Brady  plan
pricing  of  claims  on  Mexico,  although  they  imply  substantial  debt  relief  for
Mexico.  It thus  seems  a fair  agreement  and,  since  the  rolling  guarantee  was
shown  to  be more  valuable  to  the  creditors  than  a fixed  guarantee,  with
efficient  use  of official  resources.
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